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STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH IS INVOKED 
Jurisdiction for this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals is found in Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Utah 
Code; and Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 4 of the Utah Code (amended 
1986) and in Title 6 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title case filed by the Plaintiffs against Park City, 
a municipal corporation and the State of Utah for possession and title 
to the Plaintiffs family home in Park City which they and their 
family occupied since 1910. Plaintiffs also claim damages in the 
amount of $20,000.00 against Park City for their destruction of the 
home on the property. 
Park City requested the Plaintiffs to repair their home which 
they were in the process of doing when Park City issued a demolition 
permit to a third party for the destruction of the home. A claim for 
damages was timely submitted to Park City. After the house was 
removed, Park City conveyed the property to the State of Utah for 
construction of a new highway to Deer Valley in 1982. 
Park City claims they have no liability for the destruction of 
the Plaintiffs' home because it was done by a third party and the 
State of Utah claims that while their record of title to the property is 
flawed, it is superior to that of the Plaintiffs. 
A trial was held before the Court on May 6, 1987 and Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were entered dismissing 
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Plaintiffs1 Complaint and quieting title to the real property in the 
State of Utah. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and the case was 
transferred to the Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals, in an 
Opinion filed March 13, 1989 held that: the State of Utah's title, while 
flawed, was superior to that of the Appellant; the tax deeds issued by 
Summit County in 1914, 1917, 1957 and 1963 did not convey any 
real property, but only improvements; Defendants were not barred 
from challenging Plaintiffs1 title by the statute of limitation; and, 
Plaintiffs did not have a prescriptive easement to maintain their 
house and yard if their title failed. 
The Court of Appeals did not address Plaintiffs' claim for 
damages against Park City as a result of Park City's destruction of the 
home located on the property in question, or the application of the 
Utah Marketable Title Act, §§ 57-9-1 et seq. U.C.A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Statute of Limitations in Section 78-12-5.1 
Utah Code Annotated Bars A Collateral Attack 
On A "Tax Title" After Four Years 
Plaintiffs' heirs commenced living in this home in about 1910. 
In addition to continuously occupying the home since that time, the 
Plaintiffs and their heirs occupied the fenced yard adjacent to the 
property in conjunction with their home. The Plaintiffs' grandfather, 
William Rolfe, lived on the property until his death in 1939. Their 
grandmother, his wife, continued to occupy the property until 1946. 
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William Rolfe's son, Charles, rented out the house from 1949 until 
1964. He died in 1966 and his wife followed in 1981. Charles' 
daughters have regularly visited the property at least yearly since 
that time (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.2). "There was no evidence 
that anyone other than William Rolfe paid taxes on the property until 
1931" (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3). 
The documents supporting Plaintiffs' title by tax deed start 
with a quit-claim deed from McPollin to McCarrell dated March 19, 
1906 (Appendix, Exhibit 2). Neither of these parties were ever 
related to the Plaintiffs. 
On June 10, 1914, a tax deed was issued to William Rolfe for 
"improvements east U.C. track, Park City, Utah" (Appendix, Exhibit 3). 
That deed also states, "this deed is made from title secured from a 
certain tax sale in the year 1909 and by an auditor's deed to Summit 
County, dated May 14, 1914 and in accordance with Section 2655, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907." Section 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1907, provides for a tax deed for the sale of real estate sold for tax 
delinquencies. It does not allow a deed or sale of personal property. 
In fact, this Section prohibits a sale "in a cases where the description 
of such real estate is so defective as to convey no title . . ." 
Apparently, in 1914, the description was sufficient in the minds of 
the County government to describe what real estate was being sold 
since they were statutorily prohibited from the sale if it could not be 
identified. 
In the event the 1914 deed was not valid, then this property 
would have remained in the name of McCarrell, being the grantee of 
the 1906 Deed from McPollin; or in the name of one of the 
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Defendants' predecessors - Park City Smelting Company (Court of 
Appeals Opinion, p.3, ^2). One of these parties would have been 
legally responsible for paying the taxes. Section 2425, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1907. A second tax deed was executed to William 
Rolfe from Summit County on June 21, 1917 (Appendix, Exhibit 4). 
Another tax deed was also referenced in a letter from the Summit 
County Treasurer to Charles Rolfe for this property (Appendix, 
Exhibit 5). In 1963 a subsequent tax deed was issued to Plaintiffs' 
father, Charles Rolfe, who was a completely different person than 
William Rolfe and also an heir of the Plaintiffs' (Appendix, Exhibit 6). 
Letters from Summit County also confirmed that Plaintiffs had paid 
taxes from 1940 - 1957 and 1972 (Appendix, Exhibits 5 and 7). 
The Court of Appeals misinterpreted this Court's decision in 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1982) by holding that "one 
who has a tax deed but does not hold title to the property cannot 
assert" (Statute of Limitations, § 78-12-5.1). This holding is, in fact, 
contrary to the holding by this Court in Dillman, supra. The scope of 
that ruling determines that a person with legal title who is otherwise 
responsible for the taxes, cannot buttress his titles by allowing taxes 
to lapse and thereafter performing his legal duties by paying them. 
Both the trial court and appeals court found, the "vested title" 
lay in the respondent's predecessors (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3). 
Section 80-5-12 U.C.A. (1943) is almost identical to the earlier 
statute found in Section 2524, Compiled Laws of Utah (1907) and 
provides the person chargeable with paying taxes: 
"If the name of the owner or claimant of any 
property is known to the assessor, or if it 
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appears of record in the office of the County 
Recorder where the property is situated, the 
property must be assessed to such name . . ." 
If the Plaintiffs' predecessors did not hold title as a result of 
the 1907 deed, then, in 1917, the property was in the name of either 
McCarrell or Park City Smelting Company who were legally obligated 
to pay the taxes on their property. They unequivocally made no 
such payments and Plaintiffs1 tax deeds are insulated from a 
collateral attack after all these years as provided for in Section 78-
12-5.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which provides in part, 
"With respect to action or defenses brought or 
interposed for the recovery or possession of, 
or to quiet title or determine the ownership of 
real property against the holder of a tax title 
to such property, no such action or defense 
shall be commenced or interposed more than 
four years after the date of the tax deed, 
conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title 
unless the person commencing or interposing 
such action or defense, or his predecessor, has 
actually occupied or been in possession of 
such property within four years . . . " 
In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1982), this Court, 
relying on Frederiksen v. La Fleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah, 1981) stated 
"That policy of protection is based on the 
assumption that the tax debtor is the 
possessor of property which is probably his 
home or farm land." 
This property was the Rolfe family home for 70 years and 
Respondents1 claims are barred by the four year statute of limitation 
arising out of any one of the four tax deeds (Addendum, Exhibits 2-4 
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and 7) coupled with the Plaintiffs1 continuous possession. Section 78-
12-5.3 provides that the "tax title" is any title received by way of a 
sale for delinquency taxes and it is irrelevant if the title "is valid or 
not." "Real Estate" includes "the possession of, claim to, ownership of, 
or right to the possession of, land . . . " § 80-3-1(2) U.C.A. (1943). 
II . 
Title Vested In Plaintiff In 1917 By 
Adverse Possession And Cannot Be 
Challenged 70 Years Later 
Plaintiffs submit that this Court's decision in Park West Village 
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) is "on all fours" with this action 
and requires review of the Court of Appeals' decision which is in 
direct conflict with that ruling. 
Ignoring, for a moment, all evidence or occurrences after 1931, 
it is uncontested that there was "no evidence that anyone other than 
William Rolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931" (Utah Court of 
Appeals Opinion, p.3). He started living in the house in 1910 and 
resided there continuously until after 1931 (Court of Appeals 
Opinion, p.2). The record title holder, according to the Respondents 
and the Court of Appeals was Lewis Withey and Clay Holister (Court 
of Appeals Opinion, p.3, M|3,4,5). 
If any taxes were assessed on the realty then they were paid 
by William Rolfe. If, as the Court of Appeals states, the taxes were 
assessed on the improvements only, then Plaintiffs are relieved of 
their obligation to pay non-existent assessments, Park West Village 
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986), Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 
739 P2d. 1104 (Utah, 1987). 
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It should be noted that this property is right next door to the 
Avise property and the adjoining fence constitutes part of the 
definition of the yard in that case. The uncertain deeds and 
procedures followed by Summit County in early portions of this 
century are the same in that case as they are here. Once title vests 
after seven years it cannot be attacked half a century later, § 78-12-
7 U.C.A. (1953). 
III . 
Plaintiffs' "Root Of Title" Is More Than 40 
Years Old And Insulated From Challenge By The 
Utah Marketable Title Act, §§ 57-9-1, et. seq. 
William Rolfe obtained a deed to this real estate from Summit 
County in June, 1917 (Appendix, Exhibit 4). William Rolfe and his 
family or their tenants continually occupied the home and property 
until 1964 and regularly visited to the day the house was destroyed 
(Court of Appeals Opinion, p.2). This deed vested color of title in 
William Rolfe, Baker v. Goodwin, 57 Utah 379, 194 P.2d 117 (1920). 
Respondents had actual notice of the Plaintiffs1 claim of 
ownership by the recorded deed and the Rolfe families' continuous 
possession, Falcenaro Enterprises v. Valley Investment Company, 16 
Utah 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1974). 
Section 57-9-1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1963) states that 
Plaintiffs have marketable title and acts to cut off Defendants' claims 
because the "root of title" from which the Respondents1 claim 
ownership is more than 40 years old. This fact considered in 
conjunction with the fact that none of the Defendants nor their 
predecessors were ever in possession of this property, while the 
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Plaintiffs have been in continuous possession, falls squarely within 
the protection of the Marketable Title Act, § 57-9-1 et seq. and 
insulates Plaintiffs' title from the Respondents1 challenge. 
IV. 
If Plaintiffs Did Not Have Title,. They 
Had A Prescriptive Right To Maintain 
Their House And Yard 
Plaintiffs continuously used and lived at this property for over 
70 years, to the exclusion of the world. Some comment is made that 
Mr. Rolfe was given permission to build the house by Silver King 
Coalition Mine. This was impossible since this Company did not even 
claim an interest until 1926 (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3), and Mr. 
Rolfe and his wife had already been there for at least 16 years. 
Plaintiffs further stated that no one in their family had ever worked 
for this Company or any company related to it. 
If seventy years of open, notorious, and unchallenged 
possession, is not sufficient to vest title in Plaintiffs, it ripened into 
prescriptive use for the maintenance of the yard and house on this 
property, Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 (1946). 
V. 
Park City Is Liable For Damages For 
Destroying Plaintiffs1 Home 
In August, 1981, Park City had Deer Valley Resort bulldoze 
Plaintiffs' home so that the new road to Deer Valley could be built 
across this lot (Appendix, Exhibit 8). Neither the State of Utah nor 
Park City claimed Deer Valley Resort ever owned any interest in this 
property. Plaintiffs submitted a timely claim to Park City for the 
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damage which was denied. Thereafter an action in the District Court 
was filed within the time limit prescribed by State law. 
The trial court confused the exhibits and held that notice was 
not timely filed and that Park City was not responsible because the 
building was destroyed by a third party pursuant to the City's 
demolition permit. The trial court found a claim was filed on 
September 20, 1982, but that was the dat the claim was denied. The 
clam (Exhibit 18 in the trial court) was submitted August 30, 1982, 
within the time provided by law. § 63-30-13 U.C.A. (1953). The trial 
court confused the dates and the Court of Appeals did not address 
this issue. There is unrefutted testimony to the Court that the 
building was worth at least $20,000.00 (Appendix, Exhibit 9, 
Testimony of Merle Anderson) Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Ut. 
App. 1987). 
The Court of Appeals failed to consider this issue and if 
Plaintiffs1 claim and cause of action were timely under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, then Plaintiffs are entitled to damages 
against Park City for having a third party destroy the home to build 
a public road without condemnation proceedings being filed. The 
demolition permit also included the Avise house which was not 
destroyed because Mr. Avise was there. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has misconstrued Utah law 
governing statutes of limitations intended to protect title to persons1 
homes and real estate after those persons have lived in and paid 
taxes on the property for years. Conflicting standards as to when 
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and on what basis people may rely on their ownership now exist and 
must be resolved. The Court of Appeals1 decision requiers review in 
accordance with Rule 43(1), (2), (3) and (4). 
In addition, there is another action pending before this Court 
which may impact this decision. In Sweeney Land Company v. 
Kimball, Supreme Court No. 880485, this Court granted a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari dated March 23, 1989. One of the issues in that 
action involves the evidence necessary to establish rights by 
prescription as well as what constitutes "consent" to the historical use 
of property. The decision in the Sweeney Land Company, supra 
matter may necessitate review of the Court of Appeals decision in 
this action. 
The Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals that it direct the trial court to quiet title to the subject 
property in the name of the Plaintiffs and award judgment for 
damages for the destruction of Plaintiffs1 home in the amount of 
$20,000.00. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^Zday of April, 1989. 
Robert Felton 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copy of 
the Defendants-Respondents1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI by 
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United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to James W. Carter, 
Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 1480, Park City, Utah 84060 and Alan 
Bachman, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84144 on the y^-day of April, 1989 
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Velma Marchant, Elma 
Winterton, Leora Robinson, 
Wanda Penrod, Mona Lichty, 
Merle Anderson, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Park City, a municipal 
corporation, and the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
Attorneys: Robert Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
J. Craig Smith, James W. Carter, Park City, 
for Park City 
Alan Bachman, Salt Lake City, for the State 
of Utah 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orrae. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling that they 
did not have vested title to certain real property in Park City 
and thus were not entitled to recover damages for destruction 
of the home on the property* Appellants claim that they have 
title to the property through adverse possession, deeds or 
alternatively, that their use was prescriptive. Accordingly, 
they claim entitlement to $20,000 in damages for the 
destruction of the residence on the property. We affirm. 
pyp f fp? - * 
OF APPEALS • - • • * - r-% F I L E D 
Cterke/tt* Court 
Utth Court ot Appeals 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880131-CA 
In August of 1981, Park City issued a demolition permit 
to Deer Valley Resort to remove a building. The building was 
demolished by Lloyd Brothers Construction Company between 
August 4 and September 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access 
road Deer Valley Resort. Appellants brought this action 
seeking to quiet title to the real property and to recover 
damages for the destruction of the home located on the property. 
According to appellants, their grandfather, William 
Rolfe, possessed the home and yard on the property from 1910 
until his death in 1939. After his death, his wife continued 
to occupy the property until 1946. She died in about 1949. 
William Rolfe1s son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the house from 
1949 until about 1964. Charles Rolfe died in 1966 and his 
wife, Ethel Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfefs daughters, 
appellants, claim to have visited the property at least once a 
year since 1964. In support of their claim that they have 
vested title to the property, appellants rely on the following 
documents: 
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin to Jesse 
McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for ••that certain one-story 
framed, three-room dwelling house situated on the easterly side 
of Silver Creek and about 100 feet easterly from the lumberyard 
of the Summit Lumber Company.* 
2. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolph 
[sic] dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[improvements East 
U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The quit claim deed states that 
the deed is -made from title secured from a tax sale in the 
year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit bounty, dated May 
1st, 1914." 
3. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolfe 
dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame dwelling 
house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912." 
4. A letter from the Summit County Treasurer to Charles 
Rolfe dated May 16, 1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued 
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfefs father. The letter also 
stated that from 1940 to 1954, taxes were taken care of by 
widows abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid taxes of $8.06 in 
1955 and $7.33 in 1956. 
5. A tax deed from Summit County to Charles Rolfe dated 
June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard," stating M[t]his 
conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee 
of the sum of $12.53 delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and 
880131-CA 2 
costs, constituting a charge against said real estate for the 
year 1958 in the sum of $7.81." 
The State of Utah claims chain of title through a series 
of documents, all of which were recorded, and all, except 
numbers 3, 4 and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds 
description of the property. The documents are as follows: 
1. A patent from the United States government, 
undisputedly containing the property in question, to George 
Snyder on April 5, 1882. 
2. A deed from George Snyder to the Park City Smelting 
Company, dated November 14, 1883. 
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting Company to Lewis 
H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister on September 21, 1912. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds description, but 
described the conveyed property as "all of the real property or 
rights or interest in real property belonging to the Park City 
Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit, Utah," 
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis H. Withey's estate 
to Silver King Coalition Mines Company on November 5, 1926. 
The deed did not have a metes and bounds description, but 
conveyed "all the estate, right, title, interest, property, 
claim and demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey • • • 
[of] the property above described." 
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister, Withey1s tenant 
in common, to Silver King Coalition Mines on February 18, 
1927. The deed did not contain a metes and bounds description 
but described the property as "all other real property or 
rights or interests in real property . . . belonging to Park 
City Smelting Company, and situated in the County of Summit, 
State of Utah." 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to 
United Park City Mines Company, dated May 8, 1953. 
7. A deed from United Park City Mines Company to Park 
City, dated April 2, 1969. 
8. A deed from Park City to the State of Utah, dated 
June 7, 1982. 
£here was no evidence that anyone other than ^William 
JEolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931. From 1931 to 
1953, the real property in question was assessed as part of 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company. From 1954 to 1969, real 
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property taxes were assessed to and paid by United Park City 
Mines. 
The trial court found that appellants* chain of title was 
discontinuous and, at best/ conveyed title to improvements on 
the property only. The court concluded that the Statefs claim 
to title of the property was superior to that of appellants 
and, therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah and 
dismissed appellants1 complaint. 
On appeal, appellants assert that: 1) the trial court 
erred in finding that they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed or adverse possession; 2) even if appellants 
do not have title to the property, they established 
prescriptive use; 3) respondents are barred from challenging 
appellants1 tax title by the statute of limitations set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987); and 4) respondents' 
claims are barred by laches and estoppel. 
Vested Title 
Appellants first claim on appeal that the trial court 
erred in concluding they did not have vested title to the 
property by deed. Appellants assert they obtained tax title to 
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit claim deed and the 1963 
tax deed from Summit County, and any action challenging that 
title is barred by the four year statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 .(1987). In addition, they 
claim title under the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-9-1 through -10 (1986), commencing with the 1917 quit 
claim deed as the ••root* of title. The trial court concluded 
that the tax deeds under which appellants claimed title did not 
convey title to the underlying real property. 
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we 
apply a correction of error standard with no deference to the 
trial court. Creer v. Vallev Bank and Trust Co.. 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12, 12 (Dec. 9, 1988). A person who has a duty to pay 
taxes cannot fail to pay taxes and subsequently purchase the 
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to strengthen his title 
to the property. Dillman v. Foster. 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
1982); Crofts v. Johnson. 6 Utah 2d 350, 313 P.2d 808, 810 
(1957). In addition, one who has a tax deed but does not hold 
title to the property cannot assert the special statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987). 
Dillman. 656 P.2d at 978-79. 
In this case, there is no indication that William Rolfe 
was the record titleholder. Even assuming he received quit 
claim deeds from Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1957 after 
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paying delinquent taxes, we agree with the trial court that, at 
most, he received title to the improvements described in the 
deeds. The 1963 tax deed, similarly, conveyed only the 
improvements, not the underlying real property. Taxes at that 
time were apparently separately assessed on improvements and 
real property in Summit County, and the Statefs predecessor in 
title, United Park City Mines, paid real property taxes from 
1954 to 1969. The deeds did not strengthen Rolfe's title to 
the property, but merely indicated that he paid delinquent 
taxes on the property. The State's title, on the other hand, 
tthile flawed, is clearly superior to that of appellants. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
concluding that appellants failed to establish title to the 
property by deed and that the tax deed statute of limitations 
was inapplicable. 
Adverse Possession 
Appellants' second assertion of error is that the trial 
court erred in finding that appellants did not have title to 
the property by adverse possession. The proponent of an 
adverse possession claim has the burden of proving full 
statutory compliance, including the payment of all taxes levied 
and assessed. Neelev v. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 
1979). However, if a party in possession of property and his 
predecessors have paid taxes based on the value of improvements 
on the property and no taxes have been levied based on the 
valuation of the land, the party has established title to the 
property by adverse possession if all other elements of adverse 
possession are met. Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 
1137, 1140-41 (Utah 1986); s&s. zlssi Royal Street Lgnfl Co. vt 
Reed. 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987). 
In Avise, the trial court found that Mrs. Lake failed to 
acquire title to property because she failed to pay taxes on 
the property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that 
the trial court9s finding that Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on 
the property was contrary to the evidence. The court noted 
that an employee of the Summit County assessor's office 
testified at trial that he had searched the records in that 
office and could find no evidence that any taxes had been 
assessed on the land prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence 
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax notice every year and 
paid the tax that was levied. Although those taxes were based 
only on the value of the improvements on the property, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that because no other taxes were levied, 
Mrs. Lake had -paid all taxes levied and assessed" in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 (1977). The court 
also noted that there was no evidence that there were any 
delinquent taxes owing on the land for the years prior to 1975 
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or that the land had been sold by the County for failure to pay 
taxes for those years. 
Appellants claim that this case is indistinguishable from 
Avise. We disagree. In Avise, unlike this case, Mrs. Lake 
established that she had paid taxes on the improvements to the 
property for twenty-three years. In this case, however, the 
only evidence that appellants' predecessors had paid taxes on 
the property for seven continuous years were quit claim and tax 
deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to Charles Rolfe. There was 
no evidence that taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At 
best, the deeds and letter indicate that William Rolfe paid 
delinquent taxes on the personal property at various tax 
sales. Further, appellants established that Charles Rolfe paid 
taxes on improvements on the property in 1955, 1956 and 1958, 
but it was also proven that real property taxes were paid by 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company those same years. Thus, 
unlike Avise, appellants failed to prove that they paid taxes 
on the home or on the underlying land for a continuous seven 
year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 (1987). Payment 
of delinquent taxes at a tax sale cannot be used to establish 
the payment of taxes necessary to a successful claim of adverse 
possession. Otherwise, anyone purchasing property at a tax 
sale would be able to claim the number of years taxes had gone 
unpaid as a credit on the seven year period required for 
adverse possession. In addition, in contrast to Avise, the 
quit claim deeds themselves establish that taxes were assessed 
and not paid during the years appellants claim to have 
established title by adverse possession. Therefore, we hold 
that appellants failed to sustain their burden of proving 
payment of taxes for the requisite seven year period, and the 
trial court correctly concluded that appellants did not acquire 
the property by adverse possession* 
Prescriptive Easement 
Appellants also assert that even if they do not have fee 
title to the property by adverse possession or chain of title, 
they have a prescriptive easement. Appellants are unclear as 
to what they claim flows from the alleged prescriptive 
easement. If they claim that a prescriptive easement, if 
established, would give them ownership rights in the underlying 
property, they err. £g£ Osborn & Cavwood Ditch Co. v. Green. 
673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). A prescriptive 
easement does not result in ownership, but allows only use of 
property belonging to another for a limited purpose. North 
Union Canal Co. v. Newell. 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 1976). A 
prescriptive easement "arises under our common law from a use 
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of the servient estate that is fopen# notorious, adverse, and 
continuous for a period of 20 years.f" Crane v. Crane, 683 
P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 
150, 152 (Utah 1981)). The trial court concluded that 
appellants had not established a prescriptive easement.1 A 
claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary 
elements by clear and convincing evidence. Garmond v. Kinney. 
91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178, 178 (1978). Appellants not only had 
the burden of proof at trial, but on appeal are similarly 
required to marshall all evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed 
most favorably to the trial court, is insufficient. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Appellants have 
not marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings in connection with the issue of prescriptive 
easement. It further follows that on appeal, appellants are 
required to marshall evidence which would support each element 
required to prove their claim of prescriptive easement. For 
example, the trial court found that appellants' predecessors in 
interest worked for Silver King Coalition Mines Company, and 
were given permission by the company to build a house on the 
property in question. Appellants claim that this finding is 
not supported by the evidence but they do not provide,-other 
argument or reference to the trial record to establish that the 
use was "adverse," one of the required elements for 
prescriptive easement. Similarly, appellants have not compiled 
evidence which establishes the other necessary elements and 
have further failed to analyze what rights or claims to damages 
might flow from the alleged prescriptive easement. We will not 
consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the 
record or cases involving pivotal issues. Randall v. Salvation 
Armv, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984). Therefore, we 
find that appellants did not establish a prescriptive easement 
to the property. 
Laches and Estoppel 
Finally, appellants assert that Park City is barred from 
claiming ownership of the property by laches and estoppel. 
Those issues were not raised in the trial court and, therefore, 
1. The court also concluded that the prescriptive easement 
claim was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1987). However, 
in Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the predecessor section to the present 
code does not apply to actions for prescriptive easements. 
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we decline to reach them. See James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judge 
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March 13, 1989. OPINION (For Publication) 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial 
court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge; RICHARD C. 
DAVIDSON, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges, concur. 
CERTIFICATE OF HMMUg 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of March, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally 
delivered to each of the above parties. 
lse Manager 
TRIAL COURT: 
Third District Court, Summit County, 
Tfcrs/ss 
QUIT-CLATK DJ5ED. 
DAN McPOLIN and Bella McPolin, h i s wife, Grantors , of. 
the following described house ant' premises located in Park City, 
Summit County, Utah, 
All the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t of the said Grantors of, 
in and to that ce r t a in one-story, frame, three roomed dwelling 
house s i tua ted on the eas t e r ly s ide on Si lver creek and about 
one hundred feet e a s t e r l y from the lumber yard of the Summit 
Lumber Company. 
y Together with a l l the r i gh t s and priveleges of the said 
Grantors in the land on which said house stands and frfrarH imme-
March, A. D. 1906. jln A) %#/; i 
-fi^/UL )lqsfo4U\ 
EXHIBIT 2 
State of Utah, ) 
( 0 8 . 
County of Summit. ) 
On th i s 19th day of March»:v!9o6, personally appeared before 
me, Dan He?olin and Belle McPolin, his. wife, the signers of the 
^O-rA&oAn&M n^^ trument,. who duly acknowledged to me that £hey 
NotaVy public. 
^M 1ft lift 
EHTHY no. 27044. QUIT CLAIM DEED 
SUMMIT COUHTY a municipal corporation, grantor, of the State of Ut..h, £<..*« sj 
quit-claims to V/illiam Holph, grantee of Park City, Summit County, State of Utux.fwr n 
Bum of Twenty-eight.& 68/100 Dollars, ($28.6d) , the following described property U, 
fcark City, Summit County, Utah, to-wit: ~: 
&.1 
Improvements East U. C. Traces, Park City, Utah. JJ 
This deed is made from title secured from a certain tax sale in the year tifat 
and "by an axiditors deed to Summit County, dated May 1st, 1914 and inaccordanoe wilt 
Section 26o5, compiled laws of Utah, 1907. 
V/IT11ESS tne hand of said grantors, by its duly authorized clerk, this l-*.u u 
of June, A.D. 1914. 
SUMMIT C0U1JTY 
(SEAL) 
By Moses C. Taylor Clerk. 
STATE OP UTAH )
 f7y? ' & { A 
: ss. bXrabu o> 
COUHTY OP SUI.1IIT ) 
On this 10th day of June, A. D. 1914, personally appeared before me, !3>8u4 
C. Taylor, who being by me duly sv/orn, did say that he is the County Clerk of Suaii; 
County, a municipal corporation of theState of Utah, that he executea the foregoing u 
truaent in behalf of said Summit County and in accordance with a resolution of tae 
Board &L County Commissioners passed on the 3rd day of June, A. D. 1914, and said 
Moses c. Taylor, duly acKnowiedged to me That he executed ihe same. 
(SEAL) E. W. Farnsworth 
County Recorder. 
ooo 
E1ITP.Y 110. 27710. CUIT CLAIU DEED 
SDl.fl.IIT COUIJTY, a municipal corporation, grantor of the state of Utah, £.•:•»;-«-
quit-olaims to V/illiam Rolfe, Grantee of Park City, Summit County, State of Ut-u, :.iCQ 
the sum of One and no/100 (1.00) Dollars, the following described property situ^ut ;£jp 
Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, to-wit: ^ 
That certain frame dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Suimiit C;u^ :^ " 
Utah, assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912. *""* *" 
This deed is made under authority of section 2665 compiled laws of Uufc ;4».i 
as amended by Chapters 114 & 116, Laws of Utah.lvll and in pursuance of an order * 
of the Board of County Commissioners of said County made on the 5th day of June 
A. D. 1917. " ' 
WIT1J3SS the hand of said grantor, by its duly authorised Clerk, this 
21st dty of June, A. D. -1917. 
SIT. HIT COUHTY 
IM 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
By A. C. Hortin . County Cler*. 
C0UI1TY OP SUIvlIIT ) 
On this iilst-day of June, A. D. 1917, A. C. Hortin, personally appeared 
before me and being duly sworn, did say that he is the Cdmnty Clerk of Summit COUL;, 
a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, and that he executed the fore£oir.:-
instrument in behalf of said County by* authority of a resolution of the Board of 
County commissioners o| said County, passed on me 6th day of June, A. D. 1917, m 
said A. C, Hortin acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
(SEAL) Kate 7 . Ximball 
County. iieoorder. 
ooo-
May 16, 1957 
Mr Charles "olfe 
Oakley, Utah 
Dear Mr *k>lfef 
I checked over the recdrds on the tax situation if youre 
fathers place in Park ^ity, and Found that in 193S a quit 
claim deed was issued by the county to youre father for $33*00 
lhe receipt and everything was made out to William Rolfe Sr. 
So I h^ve no way of knowing who paid that money* 
From 1940 until 1954 the'taxes were taken care bf by 
widows abatement, by the county commissioners* In the year 
1955 you paid the taxes of $3^06 and in 1956 you paid the taxes 
in the amount of 7*33• 
I hape this is the information that you want, but if I 
can help you any more please let me know* 
^incerly, 
^ ^ • ^ ^ -
Summit County Treasurer, 
XHIBIT 5 
itry No. 97001 
TAX DEED (X 
t -SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and p o l i t i c of the s t a t e of Utah, Grantor, hereby rr 
anveys to Charles Rolfe Grantee, of Oakley, Utah the fo l lowing described jreal e s t a t e in 9 
JMMIT COUNTY, UTAH: 3 
House in lumber yand u 
This conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.5 
elinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charge against said real 
state, which was sold to said County at preliminary sale for non-payment of general taxes 
ssessed against it for the yean 1958 in the sum of $7.8l. 
DATED this 13th day of June 1963. 
SEAL) (Seal) 
By 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
Reed D. Pace. County Auditor. 
« « « « * -* 
lecorded at the request of County Clerk June 19 A.O. 1963 at 1:21 P.M. 
Wanda Y. Sprlggs , County Recorder 
Entry No. 97003 Revenue Stamps $3.85 (Cancelled 
Dr. Dan Oniki and K. Helen Oniki, his wife Grantors, of Salt Lake City, County of Sal 
Lake,. State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to Pete Robert Toly and Mary Lou W. Toly, his wife 
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common, Grantees of 
Park City, Utah for the sum of Ton Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the 
ollowing described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
« 
—^ o 4„ Block 28 of Snyders 
C O M M I S S I O N E R S 
CAALO* L r O « T I « 
KOY O M O I 
O. M f l V I N FLINOf * • Summit County 
State of Utah 
COALVILLE. U T A H 
r ^ . .84017^- :~ ' .^P*** ' : 
i t t i o o. Pkct 
eovMtv cLi»i 
• U N C H C * . YOUMO 
ALAM O . M A N O t I N 
*TTO«*«r 
ftOMALD ft. IIOtlNftON 
wio o. ruAiim 
**- •• 
I M I * I » 
A * « t * » 0 
Aug. 31 , 1972 
This is to advise you that your application for abatement 
of taxes for 1972 has been approved by the County Commissioners 
The abatement allowed will be shown on your Tax Notice* 
cerely, JT^ J 
Reed D. Pace 
Summit County Clerk* 
tu t *o f Structure-
_ _ _ _ - . - __ Phone* -
jaox ^ g ? -.-Iff, ftvo^fr 
a TQreerfZa^^^fc 
v^^-f/ 1 r£ /-J 
Typa of Construction 
DFrama.aBrick.Var. 
D Brick O Block G Concrete a Steal 
Max Oca Load 
RraSprinkJarOYas Q No Total 24 Speoai Aporovai* 
Board of Adjustment 
Required r Received NotReaJ 
d r e e e ' » — | * State UcTnio: - |w~CltyrX 
Health Dept. 
Fire Dept. 
HrynCo.Llc.Na Soil Report 
Water or Wett Permit 
Traffic Engineer 
Flood Control 
• SUiaUc.No*-- |*Crty/Cc*Uc.Na Sewer or Septic Tanlt 
[City Engineer (off sner 
Gasv 
; ; - - - . x 
feStataUcNo. • OtyfCcvLJaNav-
Common l-fc _ t^ .< 
t *\*m -CLJL 
„ J££s? /f/iscrS' ~ 
7 5 T 
* State-Lie. No-- ^aty/Ca-UcNOr Land Use* Cert. 
Electrical Dept; 
fa of Land or Structure (Past 3 yrs4 HiBack C G . €r S. 
Other 
xvon lot * Aeeeteory Btdgs. Now on Lot Bond Required Q Yes • No Amount 
emem/KjncLaf Const-
O Build 
D Move* . 
This appHcat^ cndees !«• become a pe«TnJt untM s*sn*d be*ow. 
.Q-Remodel 
Qc©nvert.U*e 
Q Addition 
Demokah 
perking spaces: J* 
Covered Uncovered 
HECK Zone. 
4-*-t 
Zone-Appn 
vS U P^totPian J 
I 1 C > " ~ 
Indicate* 
House or 
Houee CrGereee 
if 
Attache* * 
Signature of 
Approval ^ _ 
This parmit becomes nuiTand void if work or construction authorized is not comj 
rnenced within 180 days, or if construction or work is suspended or abandoned for*! 
period of 180 days at any time after work is commenced. I hereby certify that I haver 
read and examined this application and know the same to ba true and correctAJI ^*L 
visions of iawa and ordinances governing thia typa of work will ba compiled wrtrrlj 
whether specified herein or not the- granting of a parmit does not presume to g**y 
authority to violate or cancel the provisions of any other state or locaJ law regjOatto 
construction or the performance of construction and that I make this statarnam 
under penalty of perjury, 
Signature of Contractor or Authorised Agent 
it 
Signature of Owner (tf owner! jgn» lOete) 
fc- Census Tract. 
P 3 
Traffic Zone {Coordinate Idenu No. 
Wft'h f)iJf>'So *\ 
A Yes. 
Q Or what i s l e f t of i t , i
 g u e s s ? 
A Uh-huh ( y e s ) . 
Q Merl, do you have in your exoeripn^ • 
J - experience in your 
life, I take it you have been involved with building with 
your husband. You have any idea how much things cost, 
general idea? 
A Quite a bit. We have done
 a lot of building. 
C Tell me what kind of building you have done? 
A We built our house. 
Q When you say "we" what do you mean? 
A My husband and I. 
Q After that? 
A We have remodeled a number of homes. We have 
some rentals and we remodel them and work on then and 
replace things on them. 
Q Do you have an opinion as to what it would cost 
to replace this structure? 
A I am sure we couldn't replace it for 20,000. 
0 It would be more than 20,000? 
A It would be more than 20,000. 
Q Is there any way - ooviously the building was 
destroyed and you didn't know about it wl-^ n
 <f 
u
 "
Jlen
 it was cestrcyec, 
did you? 
A no. 
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143 
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801)649-9321 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ] 
PARK CITY, a municipal ] 
corporation, JACK ] 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, ; 
Defendants. ] 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 7174 
1 Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, 
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had 
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective 
positions. The parties appeared through, and were 
represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney, for Defendant Park City Municipal 
Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General 
for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for 
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, 
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson. 
Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit 
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were 
made by respective counsel and legal memoranda were 
submitted. 
Having given full consideration to the evidence 
admitted, the legal memoranda submitted, and the oral 
argument made, the Court having entered a Memorandum 
Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint, and each cause thereof, is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Fee ownership of the real property in.question, 
which is particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40f9" West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29f15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58,45u 
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25" West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
-2-
is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien, 
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs. 
3. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and 
costs of court, 
4. This is a final and appealable judgment. 
DATED this _£ day of 4**rreT 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
i riven 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
& 
j Crai^Smi^Wj^ Esq. 
ttornafypor Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
Atan Bachman, Esq. 
Attorney, for Defendant, 
Stat^ oi "" 
Felton,. Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143 
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801)649-9321 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. i 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
PARK CITY, a municipal i 
corporation, JACK ) 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, I 
Defendants. ] 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 7174 
i Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came on regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District 
Judge presiding. The parties appeared through and were 
represented by their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for Defendant 
State of Utah and Robert Felton, Esq., for the Plaintiffs, 
practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow 
miners to construct houses on real property the Company 
owned. 
4. Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest worked for 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to 
construct a house on the real property in question. 
5. The underlying real property in question was 
assessed by Summit County separately from the house located 
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs. 
6. Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real 
property taxes assessed against the underlying real property 
in question. 
7. Neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in 
interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in 
question. 
8. Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real 
property in question for a period in excess of seven years 
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and 
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited 
by Plaintiffs. 
9. The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim 
title to the real property in question is discontinuous. 
10. The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title 
were given by Summit County pursuant to unpaid tax 
delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying 
real property in question. 
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11. The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs1 
predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not 
a party to this action. 
12. Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature 
of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition 
permit for the demolition of the house, on proper 
application, to a third party claiming ownership of the 
house. 
13. There was no evidence presented as to the value of 
the house and no finding as to the value can be made without 
gross speculation. 
14. Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the 
house prior to September 7, 1981. 
15. No notice of claim was ever filed by the 
Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah. 
16. Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park 
City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the 
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The chain of title through which the Defendant 
State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title 
through which Plaintiffs claim title. 
2. Plaintiffs' claim to title by deed to the 
underlying real property in question, fails due to 
insufficient descriptions in the claimed deeds and a lack 
of continuity of Plaintiffs1 claimed chain of title. 
Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improvements 
located upon the real property in question. 
3. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no 
effect on title to the underlying real property in question. 
A. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the underlying real property in question add nothing to 
the title of the Plaintiffs'. 
5. Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant 
Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or 
against Defendant State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended. 
6. Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in 
question by adverse possession and claim of easement by 
prescription are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953 
as amended. 
7. Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is 
barred by Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, 
et. seq. 
8. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Park City 
Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq. 
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9. Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession of the 
real property in question fails, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show 
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon the real property in question according to law. 
10. Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the 
real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail 
since possession by Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest was 
not adverse to the interests of Defendants' predecessors in 
interest. 
11. Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the 
entire area of the real property in question fails as 
inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use 
rather than possession of or title to real property. 
12. Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs 
for issuing a demolition permit, based on proper 
application, notwithstanding whether the permit was 
wrongfully obtained or the demolition work unlawfully 
performed. 
13. Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State 
of Utah for the destruction of the house. 
14. Plaintiffs' complaint, and each cause thereof, 
should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real 
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah 
free and clear of any interest, lien, easement, or 
encumbrance by Plaintiffs. 
-6-
15. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants. 
Wherefore, let judgment be entered in favor of the 
Defendants and against the Plaintiffs in accordance with 
these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Dated this <£*#L day of June, 1987 
By the Court 
5//Jane r 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
oith, Esq. "Crjjrig sm , 
ttorney for Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
Bachman, Esq. Alan b lima ,
Attorrj£yyfor Pefendant^ 
Stati 
>ert Felton, ^  
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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STATUTES 
1. § 78-12-5.2 U.C.A. (1953) - LIMITATION OF ACTIONS RE TAX 
TITLES 
2. § 78-12-5.3 U.C.A. (1953) - DEFINITION OF "TAX TITLE" 
3. § 2655 COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH (1907) AND AMENDMENTS 
4. § 80-3-1 U.C.A. (1943) 
5. UTAH MARKETABLE TITLE ACTION §§ 57-9-2 and 57-9-3 
U.C.A. (1953) 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-5.2 
not Applicable in a quiet title action by the 
other cotenants against the purchasing coten-
ant who attempted to exclude the other coten-
ants after the purchase. Maasey v. Pro the ro, 
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983). 
—Former record titleholders. 
Where former record titleholders were obli-
gated to pay the 1964 taxes on the real prop-
erty but failed to do so and conveyed away all 
their interest and title in the property prior to 
the final or auditor's tax sale, and at such tax 
sale the former titleholders appeared and paid 
the delinquent taxes and purchased an audi-
tor's tax deed, the former titleholders, by meet-
ing their tax obligation at the tax sale, could 
not acquire any title or interest in the property 
beyond that which they already had, which 
was no interest or title since they had conveyed 
away their interest and title prior to the tax 
sale; therefore, the former titleholders could 
not and did not purchase a tax title at the tax 
sale and were not entitled to the protection of 
the tax title statutes, §§ 78-12-5.1 to 78-12-5.3. 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982). 
Validity of section. 
This statute is a valid statute of limitations 
designed to validate tax titles. Although Laws 
1951, ch. 58 repealed parent statute of Laws 
1951, ch. 19, it did not repeal ch. 19. Under 
such circumstances it is not reasonable to as-
sume that the legislature intended to repeal 
Laws 1951, ch. 19. Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 
310,283 P.2d 884 (1955) (see Compiler's Notes, 
above). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: 
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National 
Mortgage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial 
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation 
of Actions 5 84 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions 
* 42. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «» 
19(7). 
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of action or 
defense — Proviso. 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to 
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or inter-
posed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from 
the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and 
after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however, 
that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal 
title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in actual possession of such property within four years from the com-
mencement or interposition of such action or defense. And provided further, 
that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by 
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against 
such property which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax 
title. 
History: C. 1943,104-2-5.10, enacted by L. 
1961, eh. 19, 5 2. 
"Date of this act". — The term "date of this 
act," referred to in the first section, means the 
effective date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e., 
May 8, 1951. 
Cross-Reference*. — Marketable record ti-
tle, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 5 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq. 
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Superiority of tax title. 
—Quitclaim deed. 
Quitclaim deed given to utility company's 
grantor which failed to show that the maker 
had any title to the land the deed purported to 
convey other than recital that such maker was 
the heir at law of the original owner did not 
convey title to the utility company's grantor 
and the utility company did not have any 
standing to challenge the title held by later 
purchaser of tax deed State Rd Comm'n v 
Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 412, 413 P 2d 603 
(1966) 
Brighara Young Law Review. — Utah's 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles 
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v National 
Mortgage Bond Corp — A Need for Remedial 
Legislation, 1976 B Y U L Rev 457 
ANALYSIS 
Invalid tax tide 
"Tax title* 
—Failure to attach affidavit. 
Invalid tax title. 
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the 
special statute of limitations provided for tax 
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their 
tax title or their inability to establish an affir-
mative claim to title apart from their tax title 
Fredenksen v. LaFleur, 632 P 2d 827 (Utah 
1981) 
Tolling of statute. 
—Previous quiet title action. 
Section 78-12-40 permitted defendants at-
tacking a tax title in a quiet title action to 
prove tolling of the statute of limitations 
where, within one year previous, an action in 
which a similar claim had been asserted by 
plaintiffs was dismissed not on the merits 
Thomas v BrafTet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 
P2d 507 (1956) 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 72 Am Jur 2d State and 
Local Taxation § 1031 et seq 
C.J.S. — 53 C J S Limitations of Actions 
§ 42, 85 C J S Taxation § 966 et seq 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=» 
19(7), Taxation •» 803 
T a x title". 
—Failure to attach affidavit 
Failure of county auditor to attach his affida-
vit to county assessment roll did not void audi-
tor's tax deed to county since term "tax title," 
as defined by this section, would indicate that 
Legislature intended to include within statutes 
of limitation tax titles which were initiated by 
tax sales the records of which would not show 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action." 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in § 78-12-5.2 and § 59-2-1364, and the 
related amended §§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is depen-
dent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a 
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property 
whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and 
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought. 
History: C. 1943,104-2-5.11, enacted by L. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
1951, ch. 19, ft 3; 1987, ch. 4, ft 305. ch 4, ft 307 provides that this section has ret-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- respective operation to January 1, 1987 
ment, effective February 6, 1987, added the Cross-References. — Tax sales, ft 59-10-29 
subsection designations and made a statutory
 e t seq 
reference change 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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48 LAWS OF UTAH. Chap. 49. 
CHAPTER 49. 
SALE OF REAL BSTATE FOR TAXES 
An Act to amend Section 2655, Revised Statutes of U tah , 1898, as amended by Chapter 
76, Laws of Utah, 1905, relating to the sale of real estate for taxes and the distri-
bution of the proceeds. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
SECTION 1. Section Amended. That Section 2655. [Revised Stat-
utes of Utah, 1898], as amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah, 1905, be 
and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: 
2655. Real Estate Deed to County to be Sold at Auction. When-
ever a county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold for delin-
quent taxes, the Board of County Commissioners, shall, during the 
month of May in each year, after giving the statutory notice, offer for 
sale at the front door of the County Court House, at the time specified 
in the notice, all such real property not heretofore sold or redeemed; 
provided, that in cases where the description of such real estate is so 
defective as to convey no title, such real estate shall not be so offered. 
The Count}" Clerk is authorized to execute deeds therefor in the name of 
the county and attested by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of the 
title of the State, of the County, and of each city, town, school, or other 
taxing districts interested, in the real estate so sold. The money aris-
ing from such sale must be paid into the County Treasury, and the 
Treasurer must settle for the same as in the case of money received for 
redemption, as provided in the next preceding section. The Board of 
County Commissioners may at any time after the period of redemption 
has expired and before the property has been deeded to the county or 
sold as hercn provided, permit a redemption from any sale where the 
property has been sold to the county, but in no case for a less sum than 
the tax, interest and costs. All property for which there is no purchaser 
at the sale provided for in this section, shall thereafter be disposed of 
on the day of the first regular meeting of the Board of County Commis-
sioners in any month, at either public or private sale as the said board 
may determine, and the money received therefor shall be apportioned 
as in the manner of tax sales redemptions. 
Approved this 14th day of March, 1907.. 
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empowered to do any and all things necessary to make a full and com-
plete investigation of the matters and things hereinabove enumerated 
and to that end to employ the necessary clerical assistance, and to pro-
vide the necessary office room, stationery, printing, blank forms and 
other incidental matters required to carry into effect the provisions 
of this Act 
Sec. 6. Appropriation. There is hereby appropriated out of the 
General Fund not otherwise appropriated, the sum of Six Thousand 
Dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purposes of 
this Act. 
Sec. 7. Repeal. That Sections 2427x, 2427x1 and 2427x3, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1907, are hereby repealed. 
Sec. 8. * This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 20th, 1911. 
CHAPTER 114. 
COLLECTION OF TAXES. 
An Act to amend Sections 2621, 2642, 2644, 2653, 2654 and 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1907, relating to the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, tax-sale records 
and duplicates thereof to be furnished to the State Auditor; providing that taxes 
erroneously assessed or collected may be refunded or allowed by the Board 
of Count/ Commissioners; requiring the reassessment of property not sold 
because of irregularity of assessment; authorizing County Commissioners to 
accept a sum less than taxes, interest and cost in certain tax sales; providing 
for the distribution of the proceeds from tax sale redemptions; and providing 
for the sale of real estate held by the county under tax deed and for settlement 
therefor. 
Be it enacted by tlie Legislature of the State of Utah: 
. SECTION 1. Sections Amended. That Section 2621, 2G42, 2644, 2653, 
2654 and 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, be and tbe same are 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
2621. Sale for Delinquency. Eecord. On the third Monday of Decem-
ber of each year, the treasurer shall expose for sale between the hours 
of ten a. m. and three p. m. sufficient of such delinquent real estate to 
pay the taxes and costs, at public auction, at the front door of the county 
court house, and sell the same to the highest responsible bidder for cash, 
and the treasurer shall continue to sell from day to day between srach 
hours until the property of such delinquent is exhausted or the taxes 
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and costs are paid. The treasurer shall make a record of all sales of 
real property in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, therein 
describing the several parcels of real property on which the taxes and 
costs were paid by the purchasers, in the same order as the published 
list of delinquent sales contained in the list of advertisements on file 
in his office, stating in separate columns the amount as obtained from 
the tax list of each kind of tax and costs for each tract or lot, how much 
and what part of each tract or lot was sold, to .whom sold and the date 
of sale. A separate column shall also be provided Wsaid record, in which 
the treasurer shall enter the date of redemption. When all the sales 
shall have been made, the treasurer shall file the record in his office; 
provided, that in all counties there shall be adopted a uniform system 
of tax sale record, which shall be recommended by the state auditor, 
and that a duplicate of said record of each county shall be furnished 
by the county treasurer to the state auditor, in loose leaf or bound form 
as may be directed by the state auditor, and to which shall be added -
the subsequent taxes of each succeeding year, together with the redemp-
tions as reported to the state auditor by the treasurers of the various 
counties, upon blanks to be prescribed by the state auditor. 
2642. Erroneous and Illegal Taxes Refunded. Any taxes, interest and 
costs paid more than once or erroneously or illegally collected, may by 
order of the board of county commissioners be refunded by the county 
treasurer, and the portion of such taxes, interest and cost of the state, 
cities and school districts, must be refunded to the county, and the 
proper officer must draw his warrant therefor in favor of the county: 
provided that the board of county commissioners u#on sufficient evi-
dence being produced that property has been erroneously or illegally 
assessed, may order the county treasurer to allow the taxes on that 
part of property erroneously or illegally assessed, to be deducted be-
fore payment of the said taxes. 
2644. Sale Omitted for Irregularity. If the treasurer discovers before 
the sale that on account of any irregular assessment or of any other 
error any land ought not to be sold, he must not offer that land for. 
sale; and the board of county commissioners must cause the assessor 
to enter the uncollected taxes upon the assessment book of the next 
succeeding year, on the basis of the valuation and rates of the year 
for which it was erroneously assessed, to be collected as other taxes, 
are collected thereon., 
2653. Redemption. In case property is sold to the county as pur-
chaser pursuant to section 2623 and is subsequently assessed. 
pursiiant to section 2651, no person must be permitted to redeem 
from such sale except upon payment also of the amount of such subse--
quent assessment, interest and costs, unless in the judgment of the 
county commissioners the interests of the State and the county will be 
Chapter 114 LAWS OF UTAH. Ifcl) 
subserved by accepting a less sum than the amount due for taxes, 
interests and costs. 
2654. Distribution of Money Received for Redemption. Whenever prop-
erty sold to the county pursuant to the provisions of this title is re-
deemed or the certificate of sale is assigned as herein provided, the 
moneys received on account of such redemption or assignment must be 
distributed as follows: The original and subsequent taxes, and forty 
per cent, of interest and costs of sale and cost of advertising received 
must be apportioned to the state, county, city, town, school district, 
and other taxing districts interested, in the proportion of their respec-
tive taxes, and the balance must be paid to the county; provided that in 
all cases where a sum less than the taxes, interest and costs is accepted 
in settlement, the proceeds of such settlement shall be applied, first to 
the payment of the original and subsequent taxes, and the remainder; 
if any there be, to the payment of interest and costs. The county treas-
urer must keep an accurate account of all moneys paid in redemptions 
of property sold to the county and for assignments of certificates of 
sale thereof, and must, on the first Monday of March in each year, or 
at such other time as the state auditor'may direct make a detailed 
report, verified by his affidavit of each account, year for year, to the 
state auditor, in such form as the state auditor may desire. Whenever 
the county receives from the county auditor any grant of property so 
sold for taxes, the same shall be recorded, at the requeft of the county 
auditor, free of charge by the county recorder, and shall be immediately 
reported by the county auditor to the board of county commissioners. 
2655. Real Estate Deed to County to be Sold at Auction. Whenever a 
county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold for delinquent 
taxes, the board of county commissioners shall during the month of 
May in each year, after giving the statutory notice, offer for sale at 
the front door of the county court house, at the time specified in the 
notice, all such real property not heretofore sold or redeemed; provided, 
that in cases where .the description of such real estate is so defective 
as to convey no title, such real estate shall not be so offered. Tht> 
county clerk is authorized to execute deeds therefor in the name of the 
county and attested by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of the title 
of the State, of the county, and of each city, town, school or other taxing 
district interested, in the real estate so sold. The money arising from 
such sale must be pgid into the county treasury, and the treasurer must 
settle for the same as in the case of money received for redemption, as 
provided in the next preceding section. The board of county commis-" 
sioners may, at any time after the period of redemption has expired and 
before the sale as lj*rein provided, permit a redemption from any sale 
where the property has been sold to the county. All property for which 
there is no purchaser at the sale provided for in this section shall there-
80-3-1 Title 80—Revenue and Taxation [634] 
* 
CHAPTER 3 f 
.* 
A* 
DEFINITIONS *• 
80-3-1. "Property," "Real Estate," "Improvements," "Personal Prop, 
erty," "Value," Defined. 
In this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires: 
(1) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and 
taxation according to its value, and does not include moneys, credits, 
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, good will, copyrights, 
patents, or other things commonly known as intangibles. ^ 
(2) "Real estate" includes <J| 
(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of or right to the posses* 
sion of, land. .-A/ 
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land/all 
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on 
the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges 
appertaining thereto. /dgf' 
(c) Improvements. tffc 
(3) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, 
fences and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether 
the title has been acquired to the land or not. - jp 
(4) "Personal property" includes ?$!• 
(a) Every class of property as defined in subsection (1) hereof 
which is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning 
of the terms "real estate" and "improvements." i*1-
(b) Gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys.* 
(c) Bridges and ferries. $> 
(5) "Value" and "full cash value" mean the amount at which the 
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor. (L. 31, p. 123, §§ 5865, 5893, 5894.) 
History. not amount to double taxation. StilliB** 
This section was R. S. 1898, §2505; v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. ** 
Comp Laws 1907, §2505. R. 552. 'S 
Cross-references. 2. "Property." * ^ 
Constitutional provision, Const. Art. The term "property," as defined BJ 
XIII, §2 ; railroad rolling stock, etc., as Comp. Laws 1907, §2505, included W* 
personalty, Const. Art. XII, § 14. only money, but credits, etc. Ij» ? 
, ^ ^
 A A. Thourot's Estate, 52 U. 106, 110, 17*r% 
1. Double taxation. 597 * J; 
This section as it formerly read, and * £ 
Art. XIII, § 2 of the Constitution of this 3. "Real estate." . . '" g 
state prior to its amendment in 1930, An engine and boiler DU^t-.12[ W 
forbade double taxation. McCornick & brick foundation, and firmly affixeu I forbade double taxation. McCornick & brick foundation, and firmly Co. v. Bassett, 49 U. 444, 164 P. 852, ap- undtr* bolts leaded down and used m unjrj 
plying Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 2505-2509. ground workings of a mine, are ^ E g , 
But "double taxation means taxing the in term "real estate." MammotP j ^ -
same property twice." Stillman v. Co. v. Juab County, 10 U. 232, 37 r» 
Lynch, 56 U. 540, 551, 192 P. 272, 12 A. « ^ t 
L. R. 552. 4. "Value." ! ^ 
When property of corporation has been Under subdivision (5) of tnw *ifab 
taxed, its stock is nontaxable. Stillman the market value, and not tne,aS?fjLu ffcf 
v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. L. should have been taken as the r*rjjjil 
R. 552. assessment of bank shares. ^^gM^ 
The taxation of title retaining notes Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. ^ • ^ J 
and conditional sales agreements does 54 U. 49, 63, 179 P. 67. 
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 57-9-1 
* t f i ^ rv . C. 1953, 57-8-36, enacted by L. 
iJSTch:^§19-
 u. A # 
' tondominium Ownership Act. — See 
i*«fffl-l and notes thereto. 
1
 mLmin* of "amendmei Meaning 
amendments". — The term 
- i^adnients," referred to throughout this sec-
tion, means those amendments made by L. 
1975, ch. 173, §§ 1 through 19, which now ap-
pear as §§ 57-8-3, 57-8-6, 57-8-7, 57-8-10, 
57-8-13 through 57-8-14, 57-8-16.5, 57-8-18, 
57-8-24, 57-8-27, 57-8-32.5, 57-8-35, 57-8-36 
CHAPTER 9 
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 
Auction Section 
>» 57-9-1. Wk*1 constitutes marketable record 57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest —Contents 
' * '
 f5fl
* — Filing for record. 
.67-9-2. 
' 67-9-3. 
IN' 
"tf.9-4. 
title. 
Rights and interests to which market-
able record title is subject 
Marketable record title held free and 
clear of interests, claims and 
charges. 
Filing of notice of claim of interest au-
thorized — Effect of possession 
of land by record owner of pos-
sessory interest. 
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions. 
57-9-7. Existing statutes of limitations and 
recording statutes not affected 
57-9-8. Definitions. 
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction. 
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period. 
What constitutes marketable record title. 
j * Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an 
|~^ xuobroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or 
rfaore, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest as 
defined in § 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated in § 57-9-2. A person 
be deemed to have such an unbroken chain of title when the official 
public records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not 
\ than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which 
id conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest, 
dther in 
» (1) the person claiming such interest or 
u
 (2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other 
V title transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in 
the person claiming such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in 
either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest. 
[History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
fcuf ANALYSIS 
possession, 
by acquiescence. 
IpAdTene possession. 
*; M®&* continuous possession and use of canal 
^ia!a ^ ^ n^n e ty years and use of the land on 
J$T*k i i d e 8 thereof in the maintenance of the 
canal, established title in such land by adverse 
possession; possession was hostile in that it 
was of such a character that ownership could 
be inferred therefrom; city acquired title de-
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spite non-payment of taxes due to the acquisi-
tion of title prior to the enactment of the stat-
ute requiring payment of taxes as a condition 
of obtaining the title to land. State ex rel. Road 
Comm'n v. Cox Corp., 29 Utah 2d 127,506 P.2d 
54 (1973). 
Boundary by acquiescence. 
Marketable Record Title Act did not apply ^ 
defeat fundamental doctrine of boundary byny f 
quiescence established in the defendants In a 
quiet title action. Olsen v. Park Daughters In* * 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973) " 
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Purchaser § 123 et seq. 
CJ .S . — 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchuirl 
§§ 189-200. J 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of "marvj 
ketable record title" statutes, 31 A.LJUth lljf 
Key Numbers. — Vendor and Purchaser i 
130. 
57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable recoil 
title is subject. 
The marketable record title shall be subject to: 
(1) All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniment 
which such chain of record title is formed; provided, however, that a 
general reference in such muniments or any of them, to easements, tin 
restrictions or other interests created prior to the root of title shall notj 
sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be made the__ 
of a recorded title transaction which creates such easement, use resfiarij^ j 
tion or other interest. 
(2) All interests preserved by the filing of proper notice or by 
sion by the same owner continuously for a period of forty years or more£] 
accordance with § 57-9-4. 
(3) The rights of any person arising from prescriptive use or a periocT&f1 
adverse possession or user, which was in whole or in part subsequent to ^ 
the effective date of the root of title. T •«? . 
(4) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been re- L 
corded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from which ^ 3 
unbroken chain of title of record is started; provided, however, that such j 
recording shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has been ^ 
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation .& ^  
§ 57-9-3. .*:- '*. 
(5) The exceptions stated in § 57-9-6 as to rights of reversioners » ; 
leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of easements* ^ 
and as to interests of the United States. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 2. 
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ANALYSIS 
adverse possession, 
joundary by acquiescence. 
adverse possession. quiring payment of taxes as a condition of ob-
City's continuous possession and use of canal taming the-title to land. State ex rel. Road 
•or over ninety years and use of the land on Comm'n v. Cox Corp., 29 Utah 2d 127,506 P.2d 
>oth sides thereof in the maintenance of the 54 (1973). 
anal established title in such land by adverse
 B o u n d b acquiescence. 
wssession; possession was hostile m that it
 M a r k e t a b l e Record Title Act did not apply to 
m of such character that ownership could be d e f e a t f u n d a m e n t a l d o c t r i n e 0f boundary by ac-
nferred therefrom; city acquired title despite
 q u i e 8 c e n c e established in the defendants in a 
inpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of
 q u i e t title action. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. 
itle prior to the enactment of the statute re- Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of inter-
ests, claims and charges. 
Subject to the provisions of § 57-9-2, the marketable record title shall be 
tield by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free 
ind clear of all interests, claims or charges, whatsoever, the existence of 
ffhich depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred 
prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or 
charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, 
whether such interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or 
under a disability, whether such person is within or without the state, 
whether such person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, 
are hereby declared to be void. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, * 3. 
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized — 
£ Effect of possession of land by record owner of 
*' possessory interest. 
* (1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effec-
tive such interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately 
following the effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title 
tfould otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, 
Setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any 
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the forty-year period, 
fhe notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person 
acting in behalf of any claimant who is 
;* (a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncer-
tain at the time of filing the notice of claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in 
Possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during 
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